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 Special Section: Enhancement and Goodness 
 Enhancements 
 How and Why to Become Better, How and Why to Become 
Good 
 VOJIN  RAKI Ć 
 Enhancement is not a novel idea in the history of human thought. Icarus is 
reported to have wished to become more powerful than God planned humans to 
be, and Goethe`s Faustus went even so far as to conspire with Satan in order to 
obtain the wisdom God did not envision for humans. Both Icarus and Faustus 
paid a high price for their ambition: death in the case of Icarus and disappoint-
ment in what Satan was able to offer, madness, and self-annulment in the case of 
Faustus. Should we fear that human enhancement will condemn us to the same 
fate as Icarus and Faustus? And if we have reasons to fear, might  moral enhance-
ment be a solution? 
 This special section of  Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics entitled 
“Enhancement and Goodness” deals with the issue of enhancement, with a 
special focus on moral enhancement. 
 The power that the idea of moral enchancement holds over us is captured in 
the lengendary tale of Sheherezade, storyteller extraordinaire, and King Shahryar 
of Persia.  1  In Richard Burton’s classic translation, the king had a cruel and 
ruthless history of ordering his vizier to bring him a virgin for the night only to 
have her beheaded in the morning. When the vizier could fi nd no more virgins, 
he knew the wrath of the king would result in his death. In order to save the 
vizier, who was her father, Sheherazade volunteered herself to the king. During 
the night, Sheherezade began telling the vile sociopath a story that—by design—
she did not fi nish by dawn. King Shahryar became intrigued by how the narrative 
would end, and ordered her to complete the story the next night. She fi nished 
that story, but started another only to leave that one also unfi nished by dawn. The 
king, engrossed in the tale, delayed her execution for another day. The next night 
it was the same and this pattern continued as Scheherazade’s gift for storytell-
ing touched the king’s heart, eventually causing him to repent his previous 
atrocities. Now fi lled with, love and piety, he married Sheherazade. Shahryar 
became a better man. The 1001 nights Sheherezade spent with him made this 
possible. They led to Shahryar`s moral enhancement. Sheherezade used a combi-
nation of cognitive and moral enhancement to change Shahryar: she  taught him 
 This issue largely assembles contributions based on versions of papers presented at the conference 
“Enhancing Understanding of Enhancement,” organized by the Center for the Study of Bioethics, 
in collaboration with The Hastings Center, on October 27 and 28, 2015 in Belgrade, Serbia. 
 John Harris, who is jointly responsible for this volume as a guest editor, was unfortunately 
hospitalized for an extensive period in 2016 and was not able to contribute to this introduction. He is 
































































































































about morality in order to make him understand where he went wrong and at the 
same time she  motivated him by his love for her to make a better man of him. 
 In addition to a common literary theme, the aspiration to become a better 
person appears to have been one of the greatest preoccupations and passions 
throughout cultures. Not surprisingly, a lot has been written on the subject of 
how to morally enhance ourselves: sacred and secular texts written in the Jewish, 
Christian, Islamic, and other traditions being some of the most infl uential man-
uscripts on moral enhancement in human history. 
 A similar question, “How to be good?”  2  might even have received less attention 
than the question of how to  become better . A possible reason is that it is common for 
people to believe that they know how to be good, but do not think they act in 
accordance with that knowledge. Hence, they ask the question how to become 
better; that is, how to bring their actual behavior into line with their knowledge of 
what it means to be good. 
 The case can be made that humanity, in spite of all its efforts, has failed mis-
erably in morally enhancing itself throughout its history. Some successes have 
occurred: slavery has been abolished in its most blatant forms in much of the 
world, the number of liberal states has been on the increase in the last two 
centuries,  3  and the history of humanity arguably shows a steady decrease in 
violence.  4  These successes are, however, meager ones for a time span of several 
millennia, a span after which the world still sees horrendous injustices, cruelties, 
and suffering. An essential (but not the only) reason for this scanty record is 
that humans, although generally aware of their failings, have proven incapable 
of bridging the comprehension/motivation gap: the gap between how they believe 
it is morally right to act and how they actually act. 
 Apart from the gap between knowing the good and being good, moral 
enhancement also refers to humans’ better understanding of what it means to 
be good. Hence, the cognitive element in moral enhancement is also essential. 
Moral enhancement is both about cognition and motivation. Moral enhancement 
can both help humans understand how to be good and motivate them to bridge 
the gap between  knowing the good and  doing good. Moral enhancement refers, 
therefore, to a better understanding of goodness and to a successful application of 
this understanding. In that sense it is a discourse on  becoming better . 
 Can new biotechnologies give some new hope for humankind in this respect? 
Do they open up the possibility of humanity becoming better in ways it has not 
been capable of until now? Can they help humans bridge the great gap of their 
moral existence? What is the relationship between moral enhancement and other 
enhancements? How do we actually understand enhancement and how can we 
enhance our understanding of enhancement such as how to and why to be good? 
These are some of the central questions being raised in this collection of articles. 
Formulated succinctly, it is a collection that addresses from a variety of perspectives 
the issues of enhancement, goodness, and their relationship. It deals with the 
question of how and why to enhance ourselves, morally and otherwise. 
 Michael Hauskeller’s article carries the title “Is It Desirable to Be Able to Do the 
Undesirable? Moral Enhancement and the Little Alex Problem.” Hauskeller prob-
lematizes the relationship between moral enhancement and freedom. He argues 
that it is diffi cult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil (e.g., one that 
has been brought about by compulsory moral bioenhancement) can be regarded 
































































































































actually do it. If we adopted such a view we would, under certain circumstances, 
believe that the bad can be better than the good. In spite of this paradoxical con-
sequence, Hauskeller defends that view. He also argues that the strained relation-
ship between moral enhancement and freedom affects both compulsory and 
voluntary moral enhancement. Hauskeller apparently does not attach value to the 
argument that in the case of voluntary moral bioenhancement, giving up one’s 
freedom to act in a morally inappropriate way need not be permanent. We can 
imagine voluntarily morally bioenhanced people who opt to switch back to their 
initial condition; something that ongoing compulsory moral bioenhancement pro-
grams make impossible by default. 
 In her commentary on Hauskeller, Sarah Chan criticizes his attempt to defi ne 
freedom to be good entirely on our own terms and no one else’s. Such an attempt 
brought Hauskeller to equalize voluntary and compulsory moral enhancement, 
as the former allegedly makes us slaves to our prior selves. Hauskeller’s line 
of reasoning does not make sense, argues Chan, as our concept of “the good” 
is itself something that is determined in ways beyond our control. Hence, it can 
never be defi ned solely on our own terms. 
 In my article “Moral Bioenhancement and Free Will: Continuing the Debate,” 
I elaborate on issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. I expand on my 
differences with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu. Persson and Savulescu 
have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement. One of 
their central claims was that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter 
of degree. I argue that freedom as a political concept, or one that is analogous 
to a political concept is scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is a threshold 
concept. I show that a limitation of this type of freedom to will amounts to a 
limitation on our freedom to think; however, even if the dogma that denies the 
existence of a free will were true, I show that such an illusion of free will is one 
that ought to be cherished, as it is essential to our human identity and to morally 
responsible behavior. I proceed by adding three further arguments against 
compulsory moral bioenhancement. First, compulsory moral bioenhancement 
radicalizes the relationship between moral ends and means to such an extent that 
it might render the very idea of moral enhancement absurd; second, a program of 
compulsory moral bioenhancement faces the diffi culty of who/what is supposed 
to develop and run it; and third, the consequence of compulsory moral bioen-
hancement might be political repression. 
 In response, James Hughes agrees with my argument against Persson and 
Savulescu in that he also considers voluntary moral enhancement to be the most 
desirable option. Unlike me, however, Hughes is not inclined to ground his 
argument in the issue of free will. Accepting as a material fact the dogma that 
free will is an illusion, Hughes develops his line of thought in a different direc-
tion than I do, leaving aside my contention that neither the option of free will 
being reality nor the option of it being an illusion can justify the idea of subject-
ing the entire population to compulsory moral bioenhancement. 
 Harris Wiseman’s article is entitled: “Would We Even Know Moral Bioenhancement 
If We Saw It?” Wiseman is critical of the idea of moral bioenhancement. He argues 
that this idea conceals a plurality of meanings. In Wiseman’s account, morality is 
frequently approached in a dichotomous manner. Wiseman focuses in his article on 
three dichotomies pertaining to moral enhancement: “cognitive versus emotional,” 
































































































































cognition/emotion dichotomy does have limited use in describing extreme cases, 
on the whole it is a particularly distorting split that, in Wiseman’s judgment, ought 
to be strongly de-emphasized or even removed from the discourse. Similarly, the 
distinction compulsory–voluntary is not always a clear-cut one. Furthermore, moral 
bioenhancement can be both radical and remedial. In the former case it is to be 
applied “across the board,” whereas in the latter case candidates for moral enhance-
ment would be those with serious moral weaknesses (e.g., people with sociopatho-
logical personality disorders). Hence, the whole debate on moral enhancement 
ought to be conducted within a specifi ed context. Wiseman also draws a distinction 
between “hard” and “soft” moral enhancement. The latter already exists, although 
we sometimes do not recognize examples of it. According to Wiseman, my concept 
of incentivizing moral enhancement is such an example. 
 Robert Sparrow’s commentary is critical of Wiseman’s tendency to overextend 
the meaning of the term “moral bioenhancement.” Wiseman believes that state 
incentivized moral bioenhancement already exists, and denotes it by the term “soft 
moral bioenhancement.” Sparrow, on the other hand, argues that it is a mistake to 
treat this and other “forms of state paternalism” as moral bioenhancement, prefer-
ring instead to stick to the usual terminology. 
 In their article “Evaluating Moral Bioenhancement: Drawing Inspiration from 
Forensic Psychiatric Practices, Moral Education, and Public Health Ethics,” Maartje 
Schermer and Jona Specker make an attempt to approach the debate on moral 
enhancement in a less abstract fashion than they believe is frequently the case in 
existing literature. They ask which ethical considerations are appropriate to evalu-
ate moral enhancement interventions in a set of existing practices. They refer to 
debates on the proper scope of moral education, proposals for identifying early 
risk factors for antisocial behavior, and, fi nally, the challenges of balancing indi-
vidual freedom and third party concerns in (forensic) psychiatry. Ethical consider-
ations from the latter domain may be relevant when considering whether moral 
enhancement interventions ought to be compulsory, but only in that domain. Given 
all the highly diverse domains in which moral enhancement operates, Schermer 
and Specker argue that we should not expect to encounter a single well-defi ned 
set of practices that ought to be denoted by “moral bioenhancement.” 
 Bert Gordijn analyzes the attempt of Jona Specker and Maartje Schermer to 
inform and add to current debates on moral bioenhancement by focusing on moral 
education, screening for risk factors for antisocial behavior, and forensic psychiatry. 
According to Gordijn, the ethical considerations within these three practices that 
the authors advance as helpful in the discussion about moral bioenhancement 
are in fact not of much use. Although Specker and Schermer tried to approach the 
debate on moral enhancement in a more concrete fashion, Gordijn believes that 
their argument remains abstract. 
 In their contribution “Containing Multitudes: Moral Enhancement, Game Theory, 
and the Stability of Society” Anders Sandberg and João Lourenço de Araujo Fabiano 
argue that “social value orientation” (the way individuals evaluate the relationship 
between their own and other’s payoffs) might be a target of future moral enhancers. 
The decisions we make when we establish social relationships often deal with 
confl icts between the individual and society, which can be referred to as “social 
dilemmas.” Sandberg and Fabiano simulate a moral enhancement model in which 
agents play games with each other with the possibility of enhancing their social 
































































































































balance between prosociality and individual compensation-maximization is affected 
by different morally relevant factors. Hence, moral enhancement considerations 
should take issues of social emergence into account. 
 Soren Holm’s analysis of Fabiano and Sandberg’s article points to the importance 
of using the term “moral enhancement” in a suffi ciently specifi ed way. He asks how 
we are supposed to model or even think about a future in which agents can interact 
in ways we may not be able to imagine, and have values beyond our current com-
prehension and powers of action far beyond our understanding in a society struc-
tured along lines we are equally unable to fathom from our current perspective. 
Holm considers this question to pose a limitation to the argument advanced by 
Fabiano and Sandberg. 
 In contrast to the above-discussed articles, Johnny McDonald and Nicholas 
Agar do not focus on moral enhancement, but rather on enhancement in general. 
In “Transformative Change, Human Enhancement, and the Story of Job” they ask 
whether we should expect human enhancement to promote the interests of those 
who are subject to it. Their focus is on “transformative change”: a change that 
signifi cantly alters the value individuals place on their experiences or achievements. 
McDonald and Agar argue that what they call “too much enhancement” is a 
potential threat to many valuable things in our lives. For example, it jeopardizes 
our relationships with other humans. They use the case of Job as an illuminating 
example. Job lost all his children and property, but God blessed him with more 
property and objectively superior children (more beautiful and intelligent). Could 
new and enhanced offspring have made Job happier in light of the fact that he 
previously lost his earlier progeny, children who were not perfect but whom he 
loved? From his new perspective, the answer might be positive. But what if Job 
had been asked about the plan while his deceased children were still alive? Then 
the answer would almost certainly have been negative. There appears to be a tem-
poral inconsistency in Job’s evaluation of the change. This temporal inconsistency 
indicates the power of our relationships with other people and other contexts. 
 The orientation of Milan  Ć irkovi ć is also on enhancement in general. In “Enhancing 
a Person, Enhancing a Civilization: A Research Program at the Intersection of 
Bioethics, Future Studies, and Astrobiology” he argues that it might appear para-
doxical to consider bioethics and postbiological evolution in the same context. 
Nonetheless,  Ć irkovi ć argues that is precisely what we need to do to elucidate the 
possibility of transition between biological and postbiological domains on Earth 
and elsewhere. Although the transition is obviously relatable to the issue of future 
human evolution, it is also relevant in wider contexts: animal psychology, artifi cial 
intelligence (AI) studies, the Search for Extra Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) studies, 
as well as other studies of nonhuman intelligence. This transition has not been 
accompanied by a problematization of corresponding moral issues (at least not to 
the degree Milan  Ć irkovi ć had hoped for). 
 All in all, this special section is one more indication that the interest in moral bio-
enhancement and other sorts of bioenhancements is continuing to increase. Much of 
this interest is directed to the ethical issues that bioenhancement raises. It testifi es, 
therefore, to a continuation and augmentation of bioethics awareness among phi-
losophers. The fact that the collection evoked ready reactions/commentaries even 
before its publication is one of the signs of this increased interest. The rapid develop-
ment of neurosciences will only further strengthen this trend. We hope, therefore, 
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Anonymous, 18th century, Relief of an Angel, Location: Baptistery, S. Marco, Venice, Italy, 
Photo Credit: Cameraphoto Arte, Venice/Art Resource, NY. Reproduced by permission.
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